Introduction
Many factors influence bureaucratic decisions, ranging from the Presidency and the appropriating legislative body to special interests, ideology, and regulators' idiosyncratic or personal goals. 1 The interplay of these factors becomes even more complex in independent agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Electricity Regulatory Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission.
Unlike executive agencies, the heads of which serve at the President's pleasure, independent agencies are typically run by a bipartisan commission whose members serve for given terms and may only be removed for cause. * We recognize with deep gratitude the skill and ingenuity of Barbara Bean, Scott Nagele, and a host of others, whose hard work and tireless dedication made this project possible. We thank John de Figueiredo, and Steve Wildman for their helpful insights. 1 Scholars have examined a variety of mechanisms of control and influence over the bureaucracy: Congress (Weingast & Moran, 1983) ; the Presidency (Moe, 1982) ; senatorial and presidential appointment procedures (Snyder & Weingast, 2000) ; or, a combination of presidential, congressional, and special interest influence (Stehr, 1997; Ringquist, 1995; Kunioka & Woller, 1999) .
"locations" along a single dimensional ideological line. This requires Ho to drop all observations where commissioners vote unanimously. Ho finds that commissioners' votes can mainly be attributed to different degrees of ideological fervor. Ho's methodology, unlike ours, generates counterfactuals, and therefore represents a substantial contribution to the literature. Our methodology, on the other hand, allows us to employ multinomial probit models to estimate more flexible models of substitution across commissioner vote choices.
The FCC is an independent federal agency governed by five commissioners, 5 three of whom are of the same party as the President, and each of who vote on each of the Commission's orders. Commissioners have multiple voting options available to them:
affirm, concur, dissent in part, dissent in full, or not to participate. These voting patterns yield a multinomial choice for FCC commissioners. Using multinomial choice logits, we estimate the utilities that commissioners derive from their votes, based on their party affiliation, idiosyncratic preferences, and the total number of commissioners. Given that the FCC has the highest dissent rate of any independent agency (Ho, 2007) , the FCC offers an excellent case-study for examining independent agency voting behaviors.
The multinomial logit estimation yields several important results concerning decision-making at the FCC. Using chair dummy variables, we find that idiosyncratic chair effects can impact voting patterns as much as party affiliation. Using commissioner dummy variables in the multinomial logit specifications, we find that commissioners' idiosyncratic preferences are generally more determinative than party affiliation.
This indicates that personal convictions and/or idiosyncratic self-interest drive commissioner voting. Levitt (1996) We then employ multinomial probit for some of our specifications, loosening the restrictive IIA assumptions concerning the substitution of choices for commissioners and allowing observation of the substitutability of different voting choices. 8 Importantly, multinomial probit results find more statistically significant effects from party affiliation than multinomial logit results. These differing results raise the possibility that multinomial logit results understate, to some degree, the importance of party affiliation.
However, the mutinomial probit still yields large and statistically significant coefficients on chair dummies. Further, the multinomial probit results indicate that including idiosyncratic chair effects greatly change the estimated substitutability across vote choices. All of which supports the conclusion that individual preferences matterwhether these preferences are the chair's or the commissioners'. 6 We use actual multinomial logit choice rather than McFadden's conditional logit because we can represent all of our independent variables as case-specific, rather than choice-specific. For the purposes of our multinomial probit analysis in Stata 9, we re-organize the data along choice-specific lines, but we specify all of the variables as case-specific variables. 7 Recent examples include Schofield, et. al (1998) , Lacy and Burden (1999) , and Alvarez and Nagler (1998, 2000) . 8 Dow and Endersby (2004) , however, contend that the IIA assumption is not overly restrictive for most applications.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/18th/art8
In addition to our findings concerning the drivers of voting, our results yield interesting insights into the "substitutability" of the various voting actions available to commissioners: affirm, dissent, concur, and partial dissent. We find that commissioners' concurrences fall significantly more closely to dissents than to simple affirmances in commissioners' "product space." This result indicates that commissioners see concurrences and dissents as relatively close substitutes. While this may seem surprising, remember that the specifications adjust for commissioner party affiliation relative to the chair and the chair's actual vote. The close substitutability indicates that commissioners, conditional on their party affiliation, concur and dissent for similar reasons.
Concurrences and dissents may represent some type of "speaking out" or adopting different reasoning than the chair-a significant move given that the vast majority of all FCC action is done unanimously. In our data, 91% of all orders were unanimous.
Further, as discussed below, the Chair controls the agenda so that commissioners rarely vote on orders which the Chair does not want approved and for which he has failed to garner the support of the majority. (The Chair was in dissent only 0.23% of the time and partial dissent 0.18% of the time.) Concurrences and dissents, therefore, often represent opportunities for commissioners to signal various constituencies and special interest groups-rather than chances to change Commission outcomes. determining which items the commissioners will vote on (Krasnow, et al., 2001) .
Because the vast majority of votes are majorities, the chair's vote, therefore, may be treated as a given, and the other commissioners make choices based on the chair's vote. As we can see from Table One , chairmen vote to affirm 97% of the time, which reflects the fact that they set the agenda. The chair dissents on less than one half of one percent of all votes and RBOC cases comprise 6% of the sample. The number of commissioners has a mean of 5.3, reflecting the fact that the FCC has had five commissioners during most of our sample period, but saw periods with 7 commissioners during the early part of our sample. Depending on the vagaries of the Senate nomination and confirmation process and the timing of votes, there were periods when the FCC had fewer than 5 commissioners. http://law.bepress.com/alea/18th/art8
Model and Specifications
We specify a multinomial choice model among the different voting choices facing commissioners. We do not estimate McFadden's conditional choice logit, but rather the actual multinomial logit. We employ the multinomial logit because the voting choices themselves are the product attributes in our treatment, and each possible chair vote choice can enter separately as a binary independent variable. Thus, the multinomial choice yields a full and flexible structure for estimating commissioner vote choices.
The commissioners have 5 voting choices, including the outside option of not participating. Commissioners can choose not to participate (the outside option in our treatment), to affirm the decision, to concur with the decision, to partially dissent from the decision, and to fully dissent.
We assume that commissioners gain different levels of utility from different vote choices based on the commissioners' own characteristics. We denote utility with U, each commissioner with i and each vote choice with j. We define each commissioner's utility over the vote choices:
Where ij v is distributed with a Type 1 extreme value distribution, where Table 2 lists the estimates with no dummies.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/18th/art8 We now apply our specification that includes chair dummies. Table 6 Under Hundt, when Hundt voted to affirm, a majority-party commissioner had an estimated probability of 96.8% of voting to affirm and a 0.2% chance of voting to dissent.
A minority-party commissioner had a 94.4% chance of voting to affirm and a 0.5% chance of dissenting when Hundt voted to affirm. We calculate a "partisan gap," which is the difference between majority party commissioner votes and minority party commissioner votes given a certain chair vote. Under Hundt, the "partisan gap" is 96.8% -94.4% = 2.4% in voting to affirm when the chair affirms. The partisan gap in dissenting when the chair affirms is 0.5% -0.2% = 0.3%.
Under Powell, majority-party commissioner had an estimated probability of 95.8% of voting to affirm and a 1.3% chance of voting to dissent when Powell voted to affirm. A minority-party commissioner had a 91.8% chance of voting to affirm and a 3.3% chance of voting to dissent when Powell voted to affirm. Under Powell, the "partisan gap is 95.8% -91.8% = 4.0% in voting to affirm when the chair affirms. The partisan gap in dissenting when the chair affirms is 3.3% -1.3% = 2.0%.
In certain cases, the gap between Powell and Hundt is larger than the partisan gap during their tenures. During Powell's tenure, majority-party commissioners were more likely to dissent when the chair voted to affirm than minority-party commissioners under Hundt. We, therefore, calculate a "chair gap," which is the difference in vote probabilities across chairmen, holding constant the commissioner's own majority or minority party status and the chair's vote. Across Hundt and Powell, the "chair gap" is 1.3% -0.2% = 1.1% for majority-party commissioners voting to dissent when the chair affirms. The chair gap is 3.3% -0.5% = 2.8% for minority-party commissioners voting to dissent when the chair affirms. Concerning the probability of commissioners voting to dissent when the chair affirms, the chair gap between Powell and Hundt is larger than the partisan gap within both Hundt and Powell. Multinomial logit results imply that idiosyncratic chair effects can generate larger changes than differences in party affiliation.
As we can see, individual chairmen can strongly drive results, even in the presence of statistically significant partisan drivers. Idiosyncratic commissioner preference can drive results even more. Furchtgott-Roth and Hooks had the lowest relative utilities from affirming. We may want to avoid any possible problems from inferring counterfactual probabilities of how some minority party commissioners would vote if they were in the majority. In that case, we simply compare these commissioner-specific vote probabilities on Table 7 to Table 5 's inferred probabilities from the no-dummy model estimates. We restrict our attention to those cases where the model estimates match the commissioners' actual party affiliation relative to the chair. Duggan was a minority party commissioner for much of his tenure, and Furchtgott-Roth, and Hooks were minority-party commissioners. We therefore compare the estimated vote probabilities of these three commissioners.
The results are striking. According to Table 5 , in a non-RBOC case, the partisan gap when the chair votes to affirm is 95.8% -92.1% = 3.7%. According to Table 7 , the probability that Furtchgott-Roth dissents when he is in the minority and the chair votes to affirm is 82.7%. The probability that Hooks dissents when he is in the minority party and the chair votes to affirm is 73.2%. The probability that Duggan dissents when he is in the minority and the chair votes to affirm is 97.0%. The gap between commissioners can be large. The gap between Furchgott-Roth and Hooks on the probability of affirming when the chair votes to affirm is 82.7% -73.2% = 9.5%. This is approximately 2.5 times larger than the partisan gap of 3.7%. The gap between Duggan and Hooks on the probability of affirming when the chair votes to affirm is 97.0% -73.2% = 23.8%. This is approximately 7 times larger than the partisan gap of 3.7%. Simply put, idiosyncratic commissioner effects can simply dwarf the effects of party affiliation.
Multinomial Probit Results
We also examine multinomial probit results. The multinomial probit model provides a more flexible functional form, and allows us to relax the extremely restrictive IIA assumption on vote choices. This allows us to estimate the relative substitutability of different votes across commissioners. How do the different vote choices resemble each other, and how substitutable are they? Do some vote choice resemble each other more closely; i.e. do they lie more closely together on the product space?
Multinomial probit estimation raises a major computational difficulty.
Multinomial probits integrate a joint normal distribution over as many dimensions as there are choices (minus the excluded base choice). In our case, that would generate a normal distribution integrated over four dimensions. This is a very large and mathematically intractable integral, which requires simulation methods. The multinomial probit model that we use in Stata 9 employs the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator to evaluate the 4-dimensional Normal integrals in the likelihood function.
The multinomial probit model does not converge for the specification with commissioner dummies. It does converge for the specification with no commissioner or chair dummies and for the specification with chair dummies. Multinomial probit models are often weakly identified. In addition, while we observe thousands of votes, commissioners vote to affirm well over 90% of the time. In this application, the multinomial probit applies a more flexible estimation approach to certain cases with few observations. In addition, we cannot obtain multinomial probit estimates for any models that include commissioner dummies because the multinomial probit fails to converge in these cases. We briefly discuss some important difference between the multinomial probit estimates and the multinomial logit estimates, using the specification with chair dummies as our benchmark.
According to multinomial probit estimates, a vote to concur or dissent by a chair in a commissioner's own party greatly reduces that commissioner's utility from affirming. The multinomial logit does not obtain statistically significant results on those coefficients. In addition, multinomial probit results indicate that a commissioner obtains less utility from affirming when a chair in an opposing party concurs. The multinomial logit estimates a positive but statistically insignificant effect. According to multinomial probit estimates, an RBOC case greatly increases a commissioners' utility from concurring, unlike the multinomial logit. The mutinomial probit results imply lower utility from concurring when a chair in the same party votes to affirm and higher utility from concurring when a chair in the same party votes to dissent, unlike the multinomial logit. According to multinomial probit, a commissioner obtains lower utility from dissenting when the chair in the commissioner's own party votes to affirm, and a higher utility of dissenting when a chair in either party concurs.
We report the estimated error correlations of the vote choices from the multinomial probit. These essentially provide estimates on the closeness of vote choices in commissioners' product space. We then assess the substitutability for different vote choices across commissioners. Table 9 reports the correlations for the specification with chair dummies. The results indicate that concur and dissent are very close substitutes. When we examine the substitution patterns, concur closely substitutes with dissent in both specifications. In the specification with no chair dummies, affirm is somewhat substitutable with concur, and is highly dissimilar to partial dissent and dissent. In the specification with chair dummies, affirm and partial dissents appear to be close substitutes. Affirmances and partial dissents are highly dissimilar to concur and dissent, which are close substitutes. Incorporating idiosyncratic chair effects greatly changes the estimated substitution patterns across vote choices.
Overall, the multinomial probit finds more and stronger effects from party affiliation than the multinomial logit. These estimated party affiliation effects make sense. In addition, the multinomial probit finds weaker idiosyncratic chair effects. This indicates that the multinomial logit underestimates the effect of party affiliation and overestimates idiosyncratic chair effects. This problem may also exist in the multinomial logit specification with commissioner dummies. We stress, however, that the multinomial probit yields large and statistically significant coefficients on chair dummy variables, and many of these coefficients are significantly different from one another. Dow and Endersby (2004) When commissioners disagree, however, they receive utility from "breaking ranks" whether in the form of a concurrence or dissent. This result is perhaps not surprising given the way the FCC chair controls the voting agenda. Because the chair decides which orders will be voted on, commissioners vote only on orders that the chair wants to be approved-and knows he has the support for. By the time an item is voted on, a commissioner's decision to concur or dissent may make little difference to the outcome. This supports the notion that commissioner concurrence and dissent primarily serve as a signaling function by which commissioners communicate their positions to various constituencies.
Further, the chair also impacts commissioners' substitution patterns across different vote choices. Multinomial probit specifications without chair dummies generate slightly different substitution patterns than multinomial probit results with chair dummies. Different chairmen generate different utilities for each of the voting options (affirm, concur, dissent, partial dissent) available to commissioners. Controlling for chairspecific effects then changes estimated substitution patterns across vote choices.
It is likely that more ambitious commissioners, i.e., those less desirous of consensus and/or inaction, tend to cause other commissioners to concur and dissent more often. This is because concurrences and dissents are likely close substitutes as they are the main ways for a commissioner to differentiate herself from the chair and signal loyalty to constituencies and special interest groups.
Methods
FCC orders were identified by searching Westlaw. Search results were compared for certain test years with the Federal Communication Commission Record, the official publication of the FCC, with a discrepancy of roughly 1 to 2 percent. Only final orders voted by the commissioner and subject to judicial appeal were included in the database.
Bureau-level orders, which are not subject to appeal, and non-final items, like Notices of Proposed Rulemaking, not subject to appeal, were not included in the database. The search string employed for each year in the study was: "(order decision) +255 adopted +4 
